Two Soldiers' Views

[Here's a contribution from a colleague; names have been removed. On a related note, Jon Krakauer's new book on Pat Tillman, Where Men Win Glory, has just been released; see the link above.]

1. Son . . . who spent a year as a battalion intelligence officer in Afghanistan, working daily with the Afghan National Army (and has also spent time in Iraq), tells me that Afghan National Army soldier loyalties are much more complex (with even more corruption) than the Shia v. Sunni issue we see in Iraq. He says that it will take decades for the Afghan National Army to reach the point where it can take over responsibility for the security of the country. Decades in Afghanistan is not politically supportable in either the US or in any of the other countries who are providing troops in Afghanistan. He thinks that had Bush (supported by Tommy Franks) not violated the Principle of Mass, and invaded Iraq while we were still fighting in Afghanistan, it might have been possible in a politically acceptable timeframe. However, when we split forces, we lost momentum and it will take decades to get it back, for a lot of reasons.

2. Other son . . . who has also spent time in both Iraq and Afghanistan tells me that the current mission in Afghanistan is no longer supportable. That is, it would take too long and require too many troops to eliminate the Taliban. Frankly, the Taliban, scumbags though they are, is not a threat to America; Al Qaeda is. He thinks we should change the mission from defeating/eliminating the Taliban to eliminating Al Qaeda. He thinks that can be accomplished with a 75% solution in 2 to 3 years. That is, most Al Qaeda units will be destroyed but there will still be a limited, diminished threat.

However, it can not be done with the present force structure; and sending additional infantry troops is not going to help. Rather, he suggests that the force structure include only Special Operating Forces (Marine Force Rec, Army Special Forces, Navy Seals) operating as insert teams with strategically located logical support bases and air support. Changing of the force structure (with SOF units) to comply with a new mission limited to Al Qaeda destruction, would result in a significant reduction in overall troop strength, not an increase.

I am still reading Halberstam's The Best and The Brightest. My concern about Afghanistan is that the current administration will not listen to [officers like his sons], the same way that General Harkin and President Johnson did not listen to Paul Vann and the other junior officers in Viet Nam who were continuing to provide reports of Viet Cong/NVA increases in control while the ARVN was reporting all good news. Obama has bought into the Afghanistan War; it is his war that he is afraid to lose, the same way that Johnson saw China as having been lost by Truman and was bound and determined that he (Johnson) was not going to lose Viet Nam. Talking to other Marines still on active duty or working (post military retirement) in the intelligence community, I receive the same message that I am receiving from my son: We have to limit our Afghanistan mission to Al Qaeda elimination and change the force structure to support that mission. Johnson refused to listen; I hope Obama is different.